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So much has been written and said about the Gilmer' case in the last
few years that many may wonder what else, if anything, there is left to say.
Yet, as we were reminded by the proposed settlement in Martens v. Smith
Barney2 in November 1997 and the cases that seem to come down every
day, the Gilmer landscape is constantly changing.
The ramifications and implications of this case are of immense
importance today, much more so than had the decision been handed down
in the fifties. Since that time, there has been a proliferation of protective
legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA),4 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA),5 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 6 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),7 and the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA),8 almost all of which presupposes individual litigants
seeking to enforce public norms. It is this Europeanization of the
American workplace and the manner in which individual rights conferred
by these statutes are to be enforced-fairly, unfairly, or not at all-that is
at the center of the Gilmer landscape. The Gilmer decision, in other
words, has the potential to affect everyone who works for a living, whether
t The author is the Immediate Past President of the National Academy of Arbitrators
and an active arbitrator and mediator. An earlier version of this essay was presented on
December 8, 1997, as the Edward B. Shils Lecture at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Janet McEneaney of the New
York City Office of Collective Bargaining in the preparation of that address and this article.
1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2. No. 96 Civ. 3779 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 28, 1996). The settlement was proposed on
November 18, 1997.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1-2000e-17 (West 1994).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (West 1985).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (West 1994).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (West 1995).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (West 1985).
8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-6387 (West 1996).
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a manager, supervisor, or rank-and-file employee, and regardless of the
presence of unionization in the workplace. What is said or written about
Gilmer today might well be overtaken by future events. Nevertheless, it is
imperative that many of the implications we can now foresee be openly
and candidly discussed so that they are clearly understood by all.
By this time, most readers know of Robert Gilmer. Gilmer was the
Manager of Financial Services for Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation
(IJL), hired in 1981 and fired in 1987. Gilmer sued IJL alleging that his
termination was in violation of the ADEA. IJL contended that Gilmer
could not go to court to enforce his statutory right, but was required to
arbitrate the issue. When Gilmer accepted his job as manager, he
registered as a securities representative with various stock exchanges,
signing a U-4 form, which is required by the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) as a condition of employment in the securities
industry. That form provided that Gilmer arbitrate any dispute that was
required to be arbitrated pursuant to the rules of any of the exchanges with
which he was registered. At the time of his dismissal, Gilmer was
registered with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Under NYSE
rules, all controversies arising out of his employment, including
termination, had to be arbitrated 9-a requirement that Gilmer was not fully
aware of at the time. On May 13, 1991, the Supreme Court decided, by a
vote of 7-2, that Gilimer was required to arbitrate his statutory claim.
I. Tim PRE-GILMER LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Before discussing the state of the law almost seven years after Gilmer
and where it may be going, it is instructive to examine where things were
before 1991 and how it was that the Gilmer result was reached. In 1953,
not so long ago, at least in the annals of law, the Supreme Court decided,
in another 7-2 decision, that statutory claims could not be arbitrated. The
case was Wilko v. Swan,' and the statute under consideration was the
Securities Act of 1933." The opinion was written by Justice Reed; Justice
Jackson wrote a concurring opinion and Justice Frankfurter wrote the
dissent. Reading each of these opinions in light of the legal landscape in
1998 is fascinating, for the concerns expressed then resonate today.
Wilko was a customer of a brokerage house known as Hayden, Stone
and Company. He sued Hayden Stone for misrepresentation. Hayden
Stone argued to the Court that Wilko had signed an arbitration agreement,
as indeed he had, and therefore was required to arbitrate his statutory claim
rather than sue. In its argument, Hayden Stone asserted that arbitration
9. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
10. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (West 1997).
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was "merely a form of trial to be used in lieu of a trial at law."'
2
In reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court declared the
arbitration agreement invalid, asserting that Wilko could not be compelled
to waive the right to sue in a judicial forum, a right that the Securities Act
had conferred. The Court assumed-indeed, all nine justices assumed-
that the arbitrators would be bound by and would have to follow the law,
even though the arbitration agreement specified no such requirement. But
the majority went on to emphasize that an arbitration award could be
rendered without a statement of reasons explaining the result and without a
record of the proceedings, making it impossible for a court or anyone else
to examine the arbitrator's understanding of the meaning of the law or its
procedural or substantive requirements." The Court also stated that pre-
dispute waivers of the right to sue were suspect because they had to be
signed before customers could assess the consequences of the waiver. 4
Justice Jackson, as I mentioned, concurred in the result in Wilko. In
hindsight, his only caveat seems prescient. Citing the encouragement of
arbitration in what is now known as the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
(FAA), 5 Justice Jackson suggested that a post-dispute, rather than a pre-
dispute, agreement to arbitrate statutory claims could pass muster.'
6
Justice Frankfurter, having fewer concerns about arbitration generally,
dissented and would have permitted the arbitration of the statutory dispute
to proceed. He noted, however, that if the arbitration of statutory claims
were to be approved, some basis for judicial review-a record, an arbitral
opinion, or both-would be required, for "want of it [would] upset the
award."'
7
It was not very long before this judicial hostility to arbitration took a
very different turn. When faced with the enforcement of labor-
management agreements to arbitrate, the Supreme Court recognized that
companies and unions, standing on relatively equal footing, had
voluntarily fashioned private methods of dispute resolution to which they
should be held. The case was Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.'8 In
that 1957 decision, the Supreme Court, in compelling an agreement to
arbitrate, fashioned a substantive federal labor policy based on section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). 9 Though Justice
12. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433.
13. See id. at 436.
14. See id. at 435.
15. 15 ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (West
1970)).
16. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438-39.
17. Id. at 440.
18. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
19. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 449-56 (construing the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (West 1978)).
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Frankfurter, again in dissent, characterized the decision as attributing an
"occult content" to the "empty darkness" of section 301, 20 the majority
abandoned, as the Petitioner union hoped it would, the previously
expressed judicial hostility to executory agreements to arbitrate in the
collective bargaining context. Of equal importance, the Court avoided
wrestling with the scope of the "contract of employment" exclusion in the
FAA, about which the majority did not say a word.21
In 1960, some three years after Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court
decided three cases that came to be known as the Steelworkers Trilogy.
2
In those rulings, the Court emphatically approved the arbitration of labor-
management disputes and sought to protect the decisions of labor-
management arbitrators from what it considered unwarranted and unwise
judicial intrusion. The majority accepted the union's argument-an
argument with which I agree-that labor arbitration, rather than being a
substitute for litigation, was and is a substitute for industrial warfare: the
strike or the lockout. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Warrior &
Gulf, stated that the "run of arbitration cases, illustrated by Wilko v. Swan,
becomes irrelevant."2
More than twenty years later, the Court began to reconsider its view
of commercial arbitration, which, unlike labor arbitration, is the substitute
for litigation. In the 1983 decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Construction Corp.,4 the Court found that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), like section 301 of the LMRA on the labor side,
created a body of substantive law enforceable in state as well as federal
courts, and that all doubts, as in labor cases, should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.
Cone Memorial Hospital was followed by Southland Corp. v.
Keating" in 1984. In an opinion written by then Chief Justice Burger, who
had long favored less litigation and increasing resort to arbitration (i.e.,
less work for judges and more for arbitrators), the Court struck down the
California Franchise Investment Law26 on preemption grounds.27 That law,
20. See id. at 466.
21. The Act exempts from its coverage "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9
U.S.C. § 1 (West 1970). As discussed later in this article, the Supreme Court has yet to
determine the scope of this exclusion.
22. The trilogy consists of the following cases: United Steelworkers of America v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
23. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.
24. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
25. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
26. CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 1977).
27. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 1.
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designed to protect franchisees, had declared unenforceable agreements
requiring arbitration of issues arising under the California statute. In a
decision characterized by Justice O'Connor in her dissent as an "exercise
in judicial revisionism [that had gone] too far,"2 the majority reasoned that
the Federal Arbitration Act, passed in 1925, "withdrew the power of the
states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims [even state
statutory claims] which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration. '"29
Beginning in 1985, the Supreme Court turned its attention to federal
statutory claims, holding in a series of cases now referred to as the
Mitsubishi Trilogy" that plaintiffs who had signed general agreements to
arbitrate were barred from litigating statutory claims in federal court. In
Mitsubishi Motors Co. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court held
that alleged violations of the Sherman Act3' had to be arbitrated?2 In 1987
in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the Court declared that a
general agreement to arbitrate controversies barred suits alleging
violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1961 (RICO).3 Finally, in
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the Court, by the
slimmest majority, expressly overruled Wilko, finding in 1989 that claims
under the Securities Act of 1933 were arbitrable after all?4
The McMahon decision teaches that the ruling in Wilko had to be read
as barring the use of an arbitral forum only when arbitration was deemed
inadequate to protect the substantive rights at issue. And the Rodriguez
decision, in the course of finally overruling Wilko as "incorrectly
decided, ''31 suggested that it was difficult to reconcile Wilko's mistrust of
arbitration in 1953 with the Court's subsequent decisions sanctioning the
arbitration of statutory disputes. Although the Court's path from Wilko's
hostile skepticism to its strong and virtually unqualified embrace of
arbitration in Rodriguez is evident enough, I suggest that the difficulty
alluded to by the Court in reconciling the holding in Wilko with its later
decisions is due solely to the Court's refusal to acknowledge the
overriding, but generally unstated, policy consideration driving those
28. Id. at 36.
29. Id. at 10.
30. This trilogy consists of the following cases: Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); and Mitsubishi Motors Co. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (West 1997).
32. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637.
33. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242.
34. See Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 480.
35. Id. at 484.
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decisions: clearing the dockets and ridding the courts of certain kinds of
cases, particularly those considered less prestigious or less worthy of their
attention.
Justice Blackmun said as much in his dissent in McMahon," and
Chief Justice Burger was even more direct in his 1981 dissent in
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. Barrentine followed
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,38 and permitted a Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA)39 suit in the face of a collectively bargained arbitration clause. In
chastising the majority for allowing a suit under the FLSA rather than
limiting the employee to a grievance under his collective bargaining
agreement, Justice Burger stated that permitting the worker's legal
proceeding "runs counter to every study and every exhortation of the
Judiciary, the Executive, and the Congress urging the establishment of
reasonable mechanisms to keep matters of this kind out of the courts.""
Against this backdrop, the result in Gilmer, at least to those who
closely followed the Court, should have come as no surprise in 1991. In
one sense, of course, the decision was a significant extension of previous
rulings. For the first time, an agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim was
upheld in the employment context rather than the commercial contract
context of Mitsubishi, McMahon, and Rodriguez. Yet, in another sense,
the result in Gilmer, given the aforementioned policy considerations, had
the aura of inevitability.
In the Gilmer decision, the Court quickly rejected what it
characterized as Gilmer's "generalized attacks on arbitration., 41 It also
found inapposite its holding in Gardner-Denver and the line of collective
bargaining agreement cases, such as Barrentine, that followed. Borrowing
from Mitsubishi, the Court told Gilmer: "[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by
the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum.' ' 2 In adopting the argument it had pointedly rejected in
Wilko, the Court assured Gilmer that nothing had changed because of his
arbitration agreement, that he would be well served in arbitration because
he had not surrendered any substantive rights afforded by the statute, and
that all he had done was change forums.
36. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 260-66.
37. 450 U.S. 728, 746 (1981).
38. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (West 1965).
40. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 752.
41. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
42. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
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II. THE IMPACT OF GILmER ON CURRENT ARBITRATION PLANS
The Court's conclusion in Gilmer-that an employee lost nothing by
arbitrating a claim, that substantive statutory rights remained intact, and
that only the forum changed-was reached some seven years ago. The
following is an example of a mandatory arbitration plan in existence today,
a plan which an employee must accede as the price of her job:
The parties agree and consent that the arbitrator shall not be
empowered to award punitive damages in any claims arbitrated
hereunder. This waiver of punitive damages shall apply to any
claims which may proceed in a court of law in the event a court
determines that the agreement herein or agreement to arbitrate a
specific claim covered herein is not binding.
43
A section in the same plan provides: "Pre-hearing discovery.., shall
consist only of there being a mutual exchange of lists containing the names
of witnesses ... and a copy of all proposed exhibits."'
Another plan in force today contains the following provisions:
Each party may depose up to two individuals for a total
deposition time of not more than eight hours.... Each party
shall be required to provide only as much information and/or
documents to the requesting party as the producing party can
reasonably locate and assemble within an eight-hour time
period.45
If the deposition exceeds eight hours, the terms of the plan specify
that the producing party "shall solely determine the nature and amount of
the requested information" it will produce.46  The same plan permits
employees to see their personnel files and to request additional information
not in their files. However, the company is not required to provide any of
this information. Moreover, "employees shall not directly or indirectly
attempt to obtain information to support their concerns/claims from other
[company] employees outside the limitations of this procedure." 7
Think of the restrictions: two depositions, an hourly limitation on a
43. Joan Dolan & Donald Weckstein, Law and Ethics in Employment Arbitration:
Sample Clauses (Oct. 1997) (unpublished paper delivered at the National Academy of
Arbitrators Fall Educational Conference) (on file with author).
Congress later legislated that the right to punitive damages is one of an employee's
substantive rights that cannot be foregone. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 703(k)(1)(A)(i)-(B)(i), as amended by the Civil Rights Act of Nov. 21, 1991, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)-(B)(i) (West 1991).
44. Dolan & Weckstein, supra note 43.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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search for materials, and a ban on seeking information by other means.
Couple those limitations with the ethical constraints a lawyer faces in
seeking to talk to other employees of the corporate employer, a great many
of whom are protected as "clients" under other decisions of the Court,48
and certainly one can see-can you not?-that nothing had changed but
the forum.
Under the plan quoted directly above, the arbitrator is required, no
matter how complex the case, to limit the hearing to two eight-hour days.
Other plans in existence today have thirty-day time limits for filing "any
claim based... on federal, state, or local law, such as discrimination,
whether constitutional, statutory, or common law."49 Just last December,
Federal District Court Judge Robert Sweet, at the New York City Bar
Association's Leslie Arps Lecture, made the case for a constitutional right
to a lawyer in civil cases for those who could not afford one.50 Yet, there
are mandatory arbitration plans that forbid representation by counsel even
though a claimant can afford it. Other plans prohibit post-hearing briefs.
Some plans, like one of the examples quoted above, prohibit punitive
damages or an award of attorney's fees, 51 while others condition or even
prohibit reinstatement. Still others require review as if the court were
reviewing the decision of a trial court sitting without a jury. Such plans
are the creation of major employers who have found it to their advantage
to do just a bit more than change a forum.
None of these employers are members of the NASD, but the NASD
system, to which Gilmer was subject, also involved much more than a
change of forum. I am well aware that the NASD, at the urging of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and many other
organizations, including the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA), has
proposed that mandatory arbitration of statutory claims be eliminated as an
industry-wide condition for employment. The NASD is to be commended
for that step, which will probably not take effect until 1999, even though it
took some time to get there. It appears, however, that the NASD will still
permit member firms to mandate arbitration for their own employees.
Evidently, the proposal now under consideration would require that the
plans of member firms operate under guidelines based on the Due Process
Protocol for the Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising
Out of the Employment Relationship (Due Process Protocol), initiated by
the NAA. Even if the NASD's proposed step forward prevails, the plans
of individual employers will still be mandatory, thus depriving employees
48. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392-95 (1981).
49. Dolan & Weckstein, supra note 43.
50. See Robert W. Sweet, Civil "Gideon" and Justice in the Trial Court (the Rabbi's
Beard), 52 REcoRD AsS'N B. CrrY N.Y. 915, 924-28 (1997).
51. See supra text accompanying note 43.
GILMER: ITS RAMIFICAIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
and applicants for employment of their choice of forum.
As for today and at least the next year, the still-mandatory NASD
system does not provide for neutral arbitrators, as that term is commonly
understood. The current NASD arbitrators have been chosen by
representatives of the industry. Though occasionally some "public"
arbitrators have been added, there is little indication that the industry's
control of the process by which the arbitrator pool is selected will change,
even though the mandatory nature of the industry-wide system may be
abandoned. Moreover, arbitrators are not currently assigned to
employment or statutory disputes based on their knowledge of the law. In
fact, the manual given to NASD arbitrators52 provides that arbitrators need
not follow statutory law because they are not "bound" by it, a guideline
their training evidently reinforces.53 In addition, as a 1994 GAO study
pointed out,' the panel's composition does not reflect our world: almost
ninety percent of the arbitrators on that panel were, like myself, white
males over sixty."
Under NASD procedures, discovery, so important in cases of this
kind, is somewhat limited and not readily available. As for remedies,
NASD arbitrators are not required to award attorney's fees in cases where
statutes either permit or require such fees, and they are not required to
award punitive damages in instances where the courts would do so. There
is a great deal more. Although parties to NASD proceedings may request a
reasoned award, an arbitrator is bound to this request only if it is made by
both sides. Moreover, the NASD and the NYSE do not encourage written
opinions. In fact, the Arbitrator's Manual reminds arbitrators that, under
present law, reasons for a decision are not required.
It is obvious that substantial policy issues, and possible constitutional
issues,"' are raised when arbitrators of statutory disputes do not know the
law or, even if they know it, are told that they need not follow it. It is
equally obvious that similar issues are raised when arbitrators need not
give reasons for their determinations, thus precluding effective judicial
review. At times, reasoned opinions are in fact written under NASD
52. SECURITmES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION (SICA), ARBITRATOR'S
MANUAL, 27-28 (1996).
53. A recent judicial decision embodying this finding is Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,
No. Civ. A. 96-12267-NG, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 877, at *26-27 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 1998).
54. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Employment Discrimination: How Registered
Representatives Fare in Discrimination Disputes (Rep. No. GAO/HEHS-94-17 Mar. 30,
1994), in 64 DAILY LAB. REP. 1-3 (Apr. 5, 1994).
55. More recent information indicates that female representation has improved
somewhat from 11% in 1994 and now stands at approximately 16%.
56. See generally Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation
of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1997).
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procedures. However, a typical opinion merely summarizes the issues,
indicates who won, and if the employee was victorious, the amount
awarded. A district court judge in New York recently referred to one of
these opinions as "brief and cryptic" ;57 a Massachusetts district court judge
characterized other arbitral decisions as "mysterious." '  Without an
appropriate statement of the facts and an explanation of the reasons for the
award, these summaries yield precious little information about the facts of
the case and its outcome-whether the claimant's statutory rights were or
were not vindicated-both for the claimant and for employees who may
find themselves in a similar situation in the future. In the context of
adjudicating public law issues, private proceedings and short-form awards,
as now countenanced, are inadequate and unacceptable. Although the
NASD proclaims that awards issued under its rules are made publicly
available, those awards have little meaning if there is virtually nothing to
inspect.
On this point, the proposed settlement in Martens v. Smith Barney9 is
of interest. The settlement has yet to be approved and has some aspects,
such as a rebuttable presumption against depositions, that are less
appealing than others. However, several elements of the proposed
settlement represent steps forward. For example, the settlement abandons
NASD arbitration in favor of three-person panels of neutral arbitrators
knowledgeable in arbitration and the law, at least one of whom must be a
woman. In addition, there is a voluntary mediation step, and the cost of
mediation and arbitration is to be borne by the employer. The employer
also pays the cost of counsel if the claimant prevails and pays part of that
cost even if the claimant loses. Certain defenses, such as reliance on after-
acquired evidence, have been eliminated, and discovery is controlled by
the panel.
Importantly, the agreed-upon process requires written opinions
reviewable under section 10 of the FAA, and unless the claimant objects,
proceedings that are open to the public and to media representatives. Open
hearings are an overdue recognition of a point that I and others have been
making for some time: that issues of public law should be publicly heard.
To those familiar with labor arbitration, this step may come as a surprise.
Labor arbitrations are private proceedings; confidentiality is the
watchword. Indeed, the proceedings that come immediately to mind
pertain only to the parties involved and deal with contractual issues
particular to them. The proceedings to which I am referring are different.
They concern public law questions in which we all have a stake, and the
57. DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 579, 582
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1997).
58. Rosenberg, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 877, at *27.
59. No. 96 Civ. 3779 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 28, 1996).
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claimants in these proceedings act as "private attorney[s] general...
vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.""
Consequently, the public interest provides a much greater reason for the
proceedings to be open if the claimant so desires. There is also greater
reason for opinions to be reasoned and decisions to be publicly available,
even published as a matter of course, with any redacting that may be
required.'
Let me return for another moment to the NASD. Concern about its
procedures recently led the National Academy to file its first amicus brief
in a court of appeals case; in the Academy's fifty year history, the
organization had only filed three amicus briefs, all in the Supreme Court.
The brief was filed in the summer of 1997 in Duffield v. Robertson,
Stephens," a case currently pending in the Ninth Circuit. The Duffield
case involves a broad attack on employment dispute arbitration in the
securities industry as it now exists and will, in many respects, continue.
Unlike what the Gilmer Court dismissed as a "generalized attack on
arbitration,"" the attack in Duffield, bolstered by a detailed analysis of
NASD proceedings, indeed every NASD employment case, is specific.
The Academy authorized the filing of an amicus brief in Duffield because
research revealed procedural failings in the NASD arbitration system,
failings that should give anyone concerned with fairness considerable
pause. In that light, we thought it important that the Appeals Court have
the benefit of our views. 4
All of these shortcomings, all of these restrictions in NASD
procedures and elsewhere, are simply inconsistent with the Academy-
initiated Due Process Protocol. While I am aware that the Protocol is often
referred to as the ABA Protocol, if history is to have meaning, one must
remember that the idea of the Protocol, as well as the Task Force that
60. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978); Newman v.
Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
61. Public proceedings and opinions published as a matter of course would require an
amendment to section 2C of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of
Labor-Management Disputes (the Code). The Code, a joint product of the National
Academy of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Association, and the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service, is now applicable to the arbitration of statutory disputes in the
employment setting.
62. No. C-95-109, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14996 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1997), appeal
docketed, No. 97-15698 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 1997).
63. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30.
64. In Rosenberg, the attack on the NASD system was also specific. In that decision,
Judge Gertner, after a detailed examination of the evidence, found the NASD and NYSE
systems structurally biased in favor of the industry. In denying Merrill Lynch's motion to
compel arbitration, the court held that "the employer's . . . dominance of the NYSE
arbitration [made] it an inadequate forum for the vindication of civil rights claims."
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 877, at *74.
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created it, was sparked by then Academy President Arnold Zack's
testimony before the Dunlop Commission. The Academy was also one of
the first participating institutions to endorse the Protocol after its
unanimous adoption by the Task Force members on May 9, 1995.
As I mentioned earlier, the language in Gilmer-that arbitration was
only a change in forum-came from the decision in Mitsubishi, the 1985
case in which a divided Court held that a Sherman Act antitrust claim
arising out of an international transaction could be arbitrated pursuant to
an arbitration agreement.65 What the Gilmer Court ignored then and what
the NASD and many other institutions overlook now when they tell us that
arbitrators need not follow the law was another principle enunciated by the
Mitsubishi Court: if claims arise from the application of American antitrust
law, the tribunal should be bound to decide that dispute in accord with the
national law giving rise to the claim.6' Clearly, what is appropriate for
international transactions-following the applicable law-should be
appropriate for statutory disputes confined to our own shores.67
HI. TOWARD A WORKABLE EMPLOYER ARBITRATION PLAN
Certainly, decent arbitration plans exist, as I and many others would
acknowledge. By no means do all plans reach the depths of the infamous
one promulgated by Hooters of America.6 I know that some plans require
that the law be followed; that some provide adequate procedural
protections and permit representation by counsel; and that some even pay
at least a portion of a claimant's counsel fees. The plan long in existence
at Brown and Root is an example of a good arbitration plan, as are those in
effect at Rockwell International and TRW. The recently implemented
United Parcel Service plan, like the internal plan of the American
Arbitration Association, requires mediation, but, significantly, does not
command arbitration. Rather, it permits arbitration at the employee's
option. Having gone through the required step of mediation, the employee
can elect to sue. But if the employee chooses arbitration, he may also
unilaterally choose the source from which the arbitrator will be selected-
65. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 640.
66. See id. at 636-37.
67. Judge Denise Cote's decision in DeGaetano, which declared Smith Barney's
arbitration policy void to the extent that it waived DeGaetano's right to obtain attorney's
fees as a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, is a spirited case in point. See DeGaetano, 75 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. at 587.
68. See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, Civ. A. No 4:96-3360-22 (D.S.C. 1996).
In this sex discrimination case, a federal judge in South Carolina recently ruled that,
because the restaurant chain's arbitration agreement is unfair, Hooters cannot force the
employee to arbitrate her claim. See, e.g., Hooters of America, Inc.: Judge Says Ex-
Employee Can't Be Forced to Arbitrate, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1998, at B2.
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the AAA, Jams/Endispute, or another recognized impartial provider.
Yet, as the EEOC and others point out, even decent plans, if
mandatory with arbitration as a mandatory final step, raise significant
questions. For this reason, although the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 199169 is generally considered ambiguous, it is not surprising
that the EEOC has interpreted it as permitting voluntary arbitration and
prohibiting mandatory arbitration. On the other hand, it is not altogether
surprising that a number of courts have rejected the EEOC's view. 0
Those rejections, I hasten to say, and court approval of mandatory
arbitration plans, is not, in my estimation, driven by any firm conviction
that the EEOC is wrong. The plain fact is that many judges do not like
discrimination cases. They would rather have them out of the courtroom.
In the ten years preceding the passage of the 1991 amendments to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, annual filings of discrimination cases rose marginally
from 8,000 to 9,000. Following the 1991 amendments, which guaranteed
jury trials and provided for punitive damages, annual filings rose from
10,771 in 1992 to 23,152 in 1996.7' Couple this dramatic rise in
discrimination cases with the rise in federal drug cases, the time taken up
in sentencing procedures and prisoner petitions, and the shameful shortage
of federal judges, and you can begin to discern explanations.
Circuit courts even began responding to this greatly increased
discrimination caseload with what Professor Pat Hardin of the University
of Tennessee calls "deterrence"-making it harder for plaintiffs to win,
thus discouraging or barring future plaintiffs. Just look at the circuit
court decisions in McKennon v. Nashville Banner (after-acquired evidence
bars all recovery),73 O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers (replacement
by someone in a protected class is not discrimination),74 EEOC v.
Metropolitan Educational Enterprises (the narrow "method of counting
employees" for determining coverage under Title VII is appropriate),7S and
Robinson v. Shell Oil (former employees are not protected).76 It is no small
irony, as Hardin has pointed out, that the Supreme Court, which was the
first to start chipping away at statutory protections with its rulings in
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)-(B)(i) (1991).
70. See Gary v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 886 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 569 (1995); EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, 966 F.
Supp. 500 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
71. Flood of Bias Cases Means Big Changes, 154 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 353 (1997).
72. Patrick Hardin, Update on Federal Employment Discrimination Law: Observations
Concerning Some Recent Developments (Oct. 1997) (unpublished paper delivered at the
National Academy of Arbitrators' Fall Educational Conference) (on file with author).
73. 9 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
74. 56 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).
75. 60 F.3d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997).
76. 70 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 843 (1997).
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Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio7 and St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks78 has unanimously overturned these subsequent narrowing decisions
and has become, at least for now, the "honest cop.' '79 Yet the Court, while
overturning these decisions and expressing a present preference for an
expansive view of these statutory protections, has also expressed an
indifference to what actually goes on in mandatory arbitration plans, as
Gilmer made clear.
Some contend that mandatory arbitration plans may be the wrong
target, that the focus should not be on whether a plan is or is not
mandatory, but on whether it's fair, and that we should be content with
mandatory plans as long as they are fair. The argument, made last summer
at the ABA Annual Meeting by my friend and future Academy President
Ted St. Antoine, is this: in light of an overworked and underfunded EEOC,
the backlog in the courts and their aversion to statutory discrimination
cases, as well as the cost of litigation and the difficulty of finding a lawyer
willing to invest the time and energy in what will usually be a protracted
legal battle, most employees might arguably be better off with mandatory
arbitration, provided those systems have due process guarantees and offer
the full range of statutory remedies. °
Professor Samuel Estreicher, a long-time advocate of mandatory
plans, asserts that employees subject to mandatory plans would in fact be
better off. According to Estreicher, "A judgment has to be made...
whether the benefits of allowing the parties to shape their own dispute
resolution mechanism outweigh the attendant costs to the parties and to the
public policy objectives of the statutes in question."'81 Once that judgment
is made, presumably in favor of mandatory plans, we need do no more
than make sure the plans are fair.
It is, I would suggest, both naYve and unrealistic to assume that the
parties in an existing or prospective employment relationship are shaping
their own dispute resolution mechanisms. Except in the case of the highly
sought-after executive, mandatory plans are not mutually made. As recent
history teaches, employers and employees do not, contrary to what
77. 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (limiting the comparison pool in disparate impact cases).
78. 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2754 (1993) (holding that proof of pretext is not necessarily
enough for the plaintiff to prevail).
79. Hardin, supra note 72. Mr. Dooley reminded us long ago that the Court followed
the election returns. Since the Court acted in the aforementioned cases only after Congress
expressly overruled Wards Cove in 1991, it might be said that the Court, at least in this
instance, also heard Congress.
80. See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes,
Address at the ABA Labor & Employment Section Annual Meeting (Aug. 4, 1997)
(transcript on file with author).
81. Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1354-55 (1997).
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Estreicher seems to believe, "negotiate a contract that meets their joint
objectives."" Plans are unilaterally designed by employers and then put
forward as a mandatory condition of employment. If the employee or
prospective employee does not agree, she must go elsewhere, presuming
that an "elsewhere" exists. Indeed, Estreicher recognizes the absence of
any opportunity for negotiation when he argues that an employer's plan
must apply uniformly to all employees, and that the real issue is whether
such a plan, if adhering to the right standards, is "socially desirable."
I do not dispute that arbitration, if appropriately designed and
implemented, can be socially desirable and a suitable forum to resolve
public law disputes. But because individual employees have neither the
power nor the resources to bargain for the conditions of their employment,
the question is whether arbitration plans, no matter how desirable, should
be mandatory. The answer to that question does not rest on the principles
of Benthamism or, as my Trekkie friends would have it, its intergalactic
parallel of Vulcanism. Instead, the fundamental principle is the
individual's right to choose arbitration or the courts. And if an arbitration
plan is fair and fairly explained, employees and prospective employees
will choose to be bound by it.
If I am right as to this fundamental principle, we should continue to
contend that voluntary arbitration is the appropriate approach. Our
insistence will not impede arbitration as some seem to suggest. It will
strengthen arbitration and foster the fairness on which its growth depends.
In my judgment, mandatory arbitration is less and less a viable option for
employers. The momentum is against it; its days are numbered. Spurred
by the plans some employers have adopted, questions of fairness are being
raised more frequently and more urgently. The National Academy has
taken a strong position against mandatory arbitration, as have the EEOC
and the General Counsel of the NLRB. The AAA, Jams/Endispute and
other organizations, all hesitant at first, now actively encourage voluntary
agreements. Legislation has been proposed in both houses of Congress-
in the House by Representative Markey of Massachusetts83 and in the
Senate by Senator Feingold of Wisconsin 4 - to ban mandatory, pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate statutory disputes and to require that such
agreements be voluntary and post-dispute. The development of this
growing pro-voluntary sentiment was well traced in DeGaetano.8 Given
this rising tide and the increasingly close scrutiny of mandatory systems
exemplified by the analysis in Rosenberg,86 the price of sticking with
82. Id. at 1354.
83. Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1996, H.R. 3748, 104th Cong. (1996).
84. Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1995, S. 366, 104th Cong. (1995).
85. See DeGaetano, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 587-88.
86. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 877, at *26-27.
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mandatory arbitration is relatively high and, I would suggest, not worth the
candle even in the short term.
So what is an employer to do? My answer is: "Make it voluntary.
Make it fair. If you build it, they will come." I say this because nobody
relishes or wants litigation. With litigation comes its costs, its
abrasiveness, the time it takes for a final resolution of a dispute, and the
sometimes unbearable drain on the energies of the parties and their
counsel. Endless discovery, the courtroom drama, and drawn-out appeals
take their course. Employers do not want to be involved in litigation.
Employees, once they realize what it takes, do not want it either. Even
though the lead plaintiff opted out of the class in Martens,7 the proposed
settlement in that case stands as an example of my thesis: fully a year and
a half had gone by and Smith Barney had yet to answer the complaint;
almost everyone knew that the case, if it continued, might never end. The
courts certainly do not want this litigation. Even the plaintiff bar, as
represented by the leadership of the National Employment Lawyers
Association, does not want it. A review of cases in various stages of
litigation, including Duffield,8 Martens, Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc.,' 9 Cheng
Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assocs.,9° or Hooters of America, Inc. v.
Phillips,9' demonstrate that the resistance is to unfair mandatory systems.
If a voluntary system is fair, it will work. People will choose to
arbitrate rather than face the difficulties of litigation. Some employees
and, indeed, some employers, may choose to litigate a particular matter
rather than arbitrate it, especially where an area of the law is hotly
disputed. Such cases, however, should be relatively few in number. If an
arbitration system is fairly designed and implemented, most employees
will see it as more advantageous than litigation and will likely choose that
alternative. Moreover, a system that is fair to both sides, one which parties
can voluntarily opt for after a dispute arises and, perhaps, even before one
arises, has the potential of reconciling the divergent interests of employer
and employee. A unilaterally imposed condition-of-employment system
simply cannot accomplish this goal.
There will be a debate, of course, as to the meaning of "voluntary" in
this context. In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai, the Ninth Circuit, which
has carefully scrutinized mandatory arbitration issues, spelled out what is
87. No. 96 Civ. 3779 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 28, 1996).
88. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14996, appeal docketed, No. 97-15698 (9th Cir. Apr. 3,
1997).
89. 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519 (1997) (affirming trial court's determination that employer's
arbitration agreement was part of a contract of adhesion).
90. 50 Cal. App. 4th 676 (1996) (refusing to compel arbitration because procedure
lacked minimum level of impartiality).
91. Civ. A. No. 4:96-3360-22 (D.S.C. 1996).
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meant by a "knowing and voluntary waiver."92 Courts that have criticized
the standard applied in Prudential have not been as sensitive to the
inequality of bargaining power present in many, but by no means all, of
these situations." Though there will be a debate, there is a standard that
can be applied. Adaptation of the detailed waiver language required under
the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act 4 may well suffice as evidence of
the knowing and voluntary nature of one's consent. The point is that the
chances for approval of a pre-dispute agreement in which arbitration is
required will be enhanced if it is offered without strings and with a
guarantee against retaliation or disparate treatment if the offer is not
accepted.
Three final points remain: (1) the standard of review that should be
applied to the arbitration of statutory disputes; (2) the interplay of
collective bargaining agreements and statutory issues; and (3) what the
Court may do with the critical question Gilmer left unanswered-whether
the holding, which was limited to Gilmer's registration application and
thus applicable only to those employed in the securities industry, will be
applied to contracts of employment generally.
A. The Standard of Review
As a preface to the standard of review issue, the position the Board of
Governors of the Academy adopted in May 1997 deserves mention. When
the Board voted to oppose mandatory arbitration of statutory disputes, it
knew that, under present law, mandatory arbitration was permissible and,
indeed, encouraged. It could have decided that Academy members should
not take such cases, a position that was considered but ultimately rejected
because it could have left the field to some less concerned with fair
procedures. Instead, the Board chose to use the prestige of the Academy
and its members to influence the continuing debate. Accordingly, the
Academy indicated that members could take such cases. However, we
also adopted guidelines so that members could evaluate the procedures in
which they were asked to serve in hope that the Academy could bring
about change where change was required. Moral suasion, we have found,
can be effective.
92. 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3240 (U.S. Oct. 2,
1995) (No. 94-1923); see also Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co., 113 F.3d 1104, 1105-06 (9th
Cir. 1997).
93. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Great West Life Assurance Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D.
Mich. 1996); DeGaetano, 75 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. at 579; Johnson v. Hubbard
Broadcasting, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Minn. 1996).
94. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 626, 630
(1988)).
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In this paper, I will not go over the Board's guidelines in any detail. I
do suggest, however, that the Due Process Protocol and the Guidelines,
which were designed to ask the right "Beyond the Protocol" questions, can
serve as paths to a fair plan.95 The Guidelines essentially require that the
arbitrator act as a substitute for a judge. They presuppose that the
arbitrator knows the law, the burdens of persuasion and proof applicable to
the statutory claim at issue, and whether the available remedies are
permissible or mandatory. If the arbitrator does not possess the
knowledge, the Protocol and the Guidelines suggest proper training before
undertaking cases. Of particular importance for the future, the Guidelines
require the issuance of an opinion which recites the findings of fact and the
reasoning underlying the conclusions of law contained in the opinion and
award and which identifies and deals with all statutory issues raised.
There are two basic reasons why the Academy urges written opinions.
One reason, of course, is that the rigor of writing makes for better results;
writing an opinion justifying your conclusions makes you think-indeed,
makes you think you may be wrong. The second reason is equally simple:
written opinions mean reviewable decisions. The availability of review is
essential; there is no substitute. These cases deal with public law, and
public law requires public accountability. In addition, reviewable
decisions encourage greater uniformity across the land, to the extent that
the circuit courts can ever agree.
The question still remains: what standard of review should be applied
to arbitration decisions? When I began to think about the standard of
review that would be applicable to statutory disputes, I was concerned that
a more rigorous standard of review in this area would give activist judges
room to intrude even further into another area, the self-contained
governmental system we call collective bargaining. I am less concerned
about this possibility since David Feller96 convinced me that the "manifest
disregard of the law" standard, discussed by Judge Edwards in Cole v.
Burns International Security Systems,9 is appropriate in cases of this kind.
This standard is less intrusive than the "plain meaning rule" that the Fifth
Circuit and some other circuits now use in cases arising under collective
bargaining agreements. 98 Under the "plain meaning rule," a judge who
95. Those who have yet to see the Guidelines can find them on the American Academy
of Arbitrator's web site <http://www.naarb.org>. They are also on the Academy's web site
<http://www.adr.com> and on the Willamette Law School's site <http://www.willamette.
law.edu>.
96. Professor Feller, the John H. Boalt Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of
California School of Law and a past president of the National Academy, argued the
Steelworkers Trilogy for the Steelworkers' Union and was also instrumental in labor's
earlier victory in Lincoln Mills.
97. 105 F.3d 1465, 1486-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
98. See, e.g., Bruce Hardwood Floors, Div. of Triangle Pacific Corp. v. UBC,
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disagrees with an arbitrator's determination can set aside the arbitrator's
interpretation of a contract, not withstanding that it was the interpretation
for which the parties bargained if, in the judge's opinion, that
interpretation is contrary to the contract's plain meaning. In contrast,
under the "manifest disregard of the law" standard applicable to
commercial arbitration and, it seems, to the arbitration of statutory
disputes, a judge can set aside a decision only if it is clear from the record,
not that the arbitrator may have misread or misinterpreted the law, but that
the arbitrator recognized the applicable law and then proceeded to ignore
it."
The Second Circuit's decision in DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc.,' °° illustrates this point well. Under the ADEA, a "prevailing party" is
entitled to attorney's fees.'0 ' The arbitrators in DiRussa did not award
attorney's fees, and an attempt was made to overturn that portion of the
decision as in "manifest disregard of the law."'0 The court disagreed,
saying that the arbitrators did not disregard the law; rather, they were
unaware of it and no one informed them.'03 Thus, the second point of
DiRussa is this: if you are claimant's counsel, do not fail to inform
arbitrators of the relevant law.
It is possible, and perhaps even probable, that the standard of review
applicable to statutory disputes ultimately may be even more stringent than
it now appears. After all, Judge Edwards went beyond the general
understanding of the "manifest disregard of the law" standard, saying that
the assumptions underlying Gilmer were "valid only if judicial review
under the 'manifest disregard of the law' standard is sufficiently rigorous
to ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied statutory
law.'"' 4 With such language, we may rapidly approach and ultimately
reach the "absolute correctness" standard set forth in McLeod v. Egan,'0 5 a
standard which Canadian arbitrators interpreting statutory law have had to
live with for more than twenty years. This stringent standard may not be
inappropriate for an area such as this, but the precise standard of review
ultimately required by the Court to effectuate public policy remains to be
seen.
Irrespective of the standard of review that may evolve in statutory
S. Council of Indus. Workers, Local 2713, 103 F.3d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
66 U.S.L.W. 3107 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1997) (No. 97-95).
99. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (citing
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,436-37 (1953)).
100. 121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
102. See DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 821.
103. See id. at 822-23.
104. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
105. See McLeod v. Egan, 46 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) (1974).
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dispute cases and the fact that a transcript may be required in addition to a
reasoned opinion, it is inappropriate, in my judgment, to impose a review
of an arbitrator's factual findings akin to the review of agency factual
findings under the Administrative Procedure Act.' °6 The Bar Association
of the City of New York's Committee on Labor and Employment Law, in
its comments on the Due Process Protocol, has suggested such a review to
determine if there is "substantial evidence" to support the arbitrator's
findings.'" This approach would simply rob arbitration of its utility and, in
my estimation, is dead wrong. For years, arbitrators have sorted out
conflicting testimony and ascertained the facts in both simple and complex
cases. In accord with Supreme Court doctrine, their judgments have long
been accepted. '0 To subject arbitral fact-finding to judicial review would
simply invite appeals, extending the process and sapping arbitration of its
core values of speed and efficiency. While arbitrators, like parties, need to
be educated in the law as they move into the area of statutory disputes,
they can still be relied upon to determine the facts.
B. Collective Bargaining Issues and Statutory Disputes
As to the effect of a collective bargaining agreement on the arbitration
of statutory disputes, the Court has only now entered into that debate. In
the past two years, it denied petitions for certiorari in both the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,'"9
which, in effect, said that Gardner-Denver was no longer the law, and in
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co.,"0 which
said that Gardner-Denver remained the law. In Brown v. TWA,' the
Fourth Circuit recently backed down a bit from its departure from
Gardner-Denver when viewing this issue through the lens of the Railway
Labor Act. Nevertheless, Judge Posner's decision in Pryner provided the
Supreme Court with the perfect opportunity to resolve the dispute
surrounding the effect of a collective bargaining agreement on the
106. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (West 1996).
107. On file with the Bar Association of the City of New York and with the author.
108. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (holding
that a court cannot vacate an arbitration award simply because it disagrees with the
arbitrator's findings of fact).
109. See 78 F.3d 875, 886 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 432 (1996) (holding
that an employee must go through arbitration before pursuing a claim under Title VII).
110. See 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 329, (1997) (holding
that a collective bargaining agreement cannot compel an employee to arbitrate a Title VII
statutory claim).
111. See 127 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that in a collective bargaining
agreement governed by the RLA, both Title VII and Family and Medical Leave Act claims
are beyond the scope of the mandatory provisions of the agreement).
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arbitration of statutory disputes. But the Court refused to act. However, it
has now acted, taking certiorari on March 2, 1998, in Wright v. Universal
Maritime Service Corp.," an unpublished disposition of the Fourth Circuit
that followed its holding in Austin."'
The Court's hesitancy in this area generated an intense debate among
union lawyers and various commentators as to how best, in this period of
uncertainty, to resolve the tension between majority and minority interests
that may exist within a union and the tensions between a union's interest
and the interests of individual employees. Some who have considered this
issue advocate the elimination from collective bargaining agreements of all
references to statutes, leaving union members free to pursue statutory
remedies and ridding unions of the duty of fair representation claims in
this area. Others argue that employment contracts should prohibit
discrimination without specific reference to statutes, an approach designed
to preserve the Gardner-Denver "one bite out of two separate apples"
result. Still others in the debate suggest that statutes should be specifically
referenced, despite the possibility that under such clauses arbitrators may
lack the power or the inclination to award statutory remedies. They also
express concern, as I have, about the effect such specific references will
have on the standard of review normally accorded arbitral decisions under
collective bargaining agreements.
The other issue in this area-a concern more for the employee than
the union-is whether the union can ever prospectively waive an
employee's statutory rights. On this point, Max Zimny of UNITE"' and
Mitchell Kraus of the Transportation Communications International Union
have suggested that the arbitration of statutory disputes be "Gilmerized"-
that there be a separate procedure for the arbitration of statutory disputes in
which the employee, rather than the union, controls the process.
Each of these approaches has its problems. As Janet McEneaney of
the Office of Collective Bargaining describes the situation, each proposal
"has something for everyone not to like."'"5 Until the Supreme Court
clarifies the law, we cannot be sure of the efficacy of any approach. It may
be that the Eleventh Circuit had it right in Brisentine v. Stone & Webster
Engineering Corp., a case in which the Court decided that a collectively
bargained arbitration clause barred litigation of federal statutory claims
112. See 121 F.3d 702 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 1162 (Mar. 2,1998).
113. See 78 F.3d at 886.
114. See Max Zimny, Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes Under Collective
Bargaining Agreements, in PROCEEDINGS OF NYU 49TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR
175, 178 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1996).
115. Janet McEneaney, Arbitration of Statutory Claims in a Union Setting: History,
Controversy and a Simpler Solution, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. (1997) (forthcoming) (on file
with the Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal).
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only if (1) the arbitration agreement expressly authorized an arbitrator to
resolve such claims; (2) the individual employee had expressly agreed to
that provision; and (3) the employee could compel arbitration even if the
union disagreed." 6 But, as McEneaney points out, even if this approach is
ultimately approved, many vexing questions will remain, including those
pertaining to issues of financial responsibility for processing the claim and
access to independent counsel."'
C. Gilmer's Application to Contracts of Employment
Now to my final point. Gilmer did not deal with an employment
agreement, or so the Court said."' Thus, the Court finessed the question of
the FAA's applicability to contracts of employment, declining to examine
and decide the scope of the FAA's exclusion of employment contracts of
"seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce..'" 9 The issue, of course, is whether the
exclusion is applicable to all contracts of employment in interstate
commerce or whether it only excludes contracts of seamen, railroad
workers, or others directly involved in the transport of goods-what some
have called the "schlepper rule." According to the majority opinion,
Gilmer had signed a securities registration application which, in the
Court's view, was not a contract of employment. Thus, it is difficult to
know with any certainty whether managerial and non-represented
employees who sign or are otherwise bound by employment agreements
will be required to arbitrate their statutory claims under the FAA, or
whether Gilmer will be confined, as it is now, to the securities industry.
The Court, as it said, has left that "scope of exclusion" question "for
another day."'"0
That day will arrive and when it does, it is altogether likely that the
Court will select the narrow interpretation adopted by the overloaded
courts below. As Professor Matthew Finkin has convincingly
demonstrated, both before and after Pryner, those courts are wrong in that
they have completely misread the FAA's legislative history.
2'
Nevertheless, our highest court, driven by a host of policy considerations,
will most likely agree with them. Finkin points out that Congress, not the
116. See 117 F.3d 519, 526-27 (11th Cir. 1997).
117. See McEneaney, supra note 115.
118. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
119. 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1998).
120. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 & n.2.
121. See Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under the United States Arbitration
Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 289-90
(1996); Matthew W. Finkin, Employment Contracts Under the FAA-Reconsidered, 48
LAB. L.J. 329, 333 (1997).
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courts, is the proper forum to sort out these issues, since it was Congress
that avoided the policy questions inherent in unilaterally promulgated
employment arbitration plans in 1925. But it may well be, given its
history in the area of arbitration, that the Court will choose to act.
Unless the Court curtails its activist expansion of the FAA, which
began with Southland and Mitsubishi, we can expect an enormous
expansion of Gilmer's reach when it finally deals with the FAA "contract
of employment" exclusion. In that event, the consequences of Gilmer and
its effect on all of us-employers, employees, practitioners, and, if I may
add, mediators and arbitrators-will be with us for a very long time.
Since the Court seems unwilling for now to confront the inequality of
bargaining power inherent in the typical relationship between an employer
and an individual employee and the consequent unfairness of arbitration
systems imposed as conditions of employment, I do not expect that the
Court's anticipated extension of Gilmer's scope will be tempered by due
process considerations or protective guidelines. Certainly, nothing we
have seen since Gilmer suggests attention to these concerns. As a
consequence, it will be up to employers-and in those situations where a
union joins the process, up to the union as well-to adopt systems built on
the principles of the Due Process Protocol and the Academy Guidelines.
Only then will the arbitration of statutory disputes over civil rights claims
be what the Court mistakenly said it was in Gilmer-solely a change in
forum-not more but certainly not less.
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